Contrary to an oft-made claim, there are observational distinctions between "many-worlds" quantum theories, in which the quantum state "branches" without collapsing, and "single-history" quantum theories, in which something like a single macroscopic history occurs through some process such as the continual collapse or reduction of the quantum state. The observational distinctions occur as a result of processes in which observers are created or destroyed. One example is whether you may expect to observe anything within this universe after a time long compared with your life expectancy. Other examples are whether we would be expected to observe an expanding universe today in certain theories of quantum cosmology, or what value we might expect to observe for the cosmological constant. * Alberta-Thy-04-99, quant-th/9904004 † Internet address: don@phys.ualberta.ca 1
Quantum mechanics is so mysterious that its precise content or interpretation is not agreed upon even by leading physicists. Although the number of versions or interpretations of quantum mechanics is huge, here I wish to focus upon two main classes of interpretations, which I shall call "single-history" versions and "manyworlds" versions, and show how they might be distinguished observationally. (Similar observational distinctions can be made between analogous "single-history" and "many-worlds" versions of classical physics, but since we know that the universe is quantum, here I shall focus on quantum theories.)
In single-history versions, the quantum formalism gives probabilities for various alternative sequences of events, but only one choice among the possible alternatives is assumed to occur in actuality. For example, a wavefunction that gives nonzero amplitudes for many different alternative events may be assumed to undergo a sequence of collapses to give a single sequence of actually occurring events, which may be considered to be a unique history (at least in some macroscopic or coarse-grained sense). An alternative single-histories interpretation is the Bohm-deBroglie pilotwave theory [1] , in which the wavefunction never collapses but acts as a pilot wave to guide in the configuration space a trajectory that may be regarded as the single actual history of the theory.
On the other hand, the many-worlds versions began with Everett's relativestate formalism [2] in which the wavefunction never collapses. In a suitable basis each component of the wavefunction may be considered to be a different "world," leading to this interpretation's being labeled the "many-worlds" interpretation. The Bohm-deBroglie pilot wave theory may also be extended to a many-worlds version of quantum mechanics by postulating that not just one but a whole set of trajectories actually occurs.
The consistent or decohering histories formulation of quantum mechanics [3] does not by itself imply whether only a single coarse-grained history actually occurs, or whether many do, say all histories with nonzero probabilities within a single consistent set of histories, so it can be either a single-history or a many-worlds version of quantum mechanics. This formalism is designed to give the probabilities of individual coarse-grained histories in any set of consistent histories. These probabilities do not depend on whether only one, or instead many, of the histories are actual rather than merely possible. However, in this paper I shall consider probabilities for observations rather than merely probabilities for histories, so the consistent or decohering histories formalism needs to be extended in order to calculate these probabilities of interest here. The extension then depends on whether many, or only one, of the histories are actual.
It is often claimed that there is no observational distinction between many-world and single-history versions of a quantum theory [4] , but here I shall refute that.
In processes in which observers are neither created or destroyed, and in which observations are remembered, it does seem to be true that there is generally no distinction that a single observer can make in practice between single-history and many-worlds quantum theories that are otherwise identical. This is because then the measure for each observation in a many-world theory is proportional to the probability of that observation in the corresponding single-history theory. This result depends upon the lack of interference between "worlds" in which different observations are made, which is assured if the memory records of the different observations are orthogonal.
To circumvent this no-observable-distinction result, David Deutsch [5] has proposed an experiment in which an observer "splits" into two copies which make different observations. The two copies record that they observed (but not what they observed) and then forget what they observed before being rejoined coherently back into a single copy. However, this experiment appears to be technologically extremely challenging.
On the other hand, what I wish to demonstrate here is that if observers are created or destroyed, so that different "worlds" do not have the same observers or the same types of observations, then the measures for observations in the manyworlds theory can be different from being merely proportional to the probabilities in the corresponding single-history theory. Then what an observer would be typically expected to observe in the many-worlds theory can be very improbable within the corresponding single-history theory, or vice versa, leading to an observational distinction between the two theories.
One example of an observational distinction between many-world and singlehistory quantum theories is what observers should expect to observe when their destruction has significant quantum uncertainties. This seems almost certainly to be the case for human observers on earth [6] . Then in some "worlds," an observer would have one lifetime, whereas in other "worlds" he or she would have a greatly different lifetime.
It is plausible to make the unproven assumption that human observers on earth in our present "world" have a very tiny but nonzero measure or probability of living far beyond their life expectancy [6] . For example, assume that if you are a twentieth century reader of this paper, the year 2100 is sufficiently beyond your life expectancy that in almost all (but not quite all) "worlds," you will be dead then. Therefore, in a single-history quantum theory it would be very improbable for you to find yourself alive in 2100. On the other hand, in a many-worlds quantum theory I predict there will be some "worlds" in which you are alive then and remember my prediction.
Thus, if you are alive in the year 2100 in this universe and remember my prediction that you indeed will be, this will be strong evidence for a many-worlds quantum theory rather than for a single-history theory, since by the assumptions above, in a single-history theory it would be very improbable for the single existing "world" in the year 2100 to have you alive in it.
I first heard this bizarre prediction of many-worlds quantum theory from Edward Teller [7] , but he seemed to regard it as a reductio ad absurdum, which I do not.
The longer one waits into the future, the smaller the quantum mechanical measure (e.g., expectation value) for an observer alive at the end of the twentieth century to be alive then, but presumably this measure never drops precisely to zero at any finite time. One might summarize this gradual diminishment of the measure for the continued existence of an observer in many-worlds quantum theory by saying, "Old observers never die; they just fade away."
The prediction of this section has the advantage of being testable by each of you (at least if a many-worlds theory is correct; if instead a single-history theory is correct, that alternative would not be observationally confirmed within this universe by the failure of the prediction to come true, because then you would be dead and presumably not conscious within this universe of the failure of the prediction). However, the prediction does have the disadvantage of requiring a long wait.
One could attempt to speed up the test by trying to perform Deutsch's proposed experiment [5] mentioned above, but I doubt that this experiment could be performed before the year 2100, if ever, so it might not be any faster than just waiting for my prediction to be fulfilled. Another attempt to speed up the test would be to try something like Russian roulette [6, 8] a large number of times, assuming that its randomness can be traced to quantum mechanical fluctuations: If a many-worlds theory is correct, there would almost certainly be a "world" in which you survived, but if a single-history theory is correct, after pulling the trigger many times, you would most likely no longer be alive at all (at least within this universe). However, this Letter should not be interpreted as recommending such an unethical experiment.
An ethical way to try to find observational evidence in the near future to distinguish between many-worlds and single-history quantum theories would be to look at the different effects of such theories, not on the destruction of observers, but on their creation.
Consider a theory of quantum cosmology that gives a quantum state for the universe in which there are different "worlds" with greatly different numbers of observers. For calculating how typical various observations are, in a single-history theory one should weight the "worlds" purely by how probable they are, but in a many-worlds theory, one should weight the "worlds" not only by their quantum mechanical measures (the analogue in a deterministic many-worlds theory of the probabilities in an indeterministic single-histories theory), but also by how much observation occurs within each "world." This distinction leads to different predic-tions as to which observations would be typical within the two types of theories.
As a grossly oversimplified illustrative example, consider the example in which a quantum cosmology theory gave a quantum state (before any possible collapse) that had one "world" (e.g., one macroscopic component of the wavefunction, or one decohering coarse-grained history) with observers, and a second one with none. Suppose that the first "world" had a measure of 0.0000000001 and the second one had a measure of 0.9999999999.
In the single-history version of this theory, these two normalized measures would be the probabilities for the two "worlds," so the probability would be extremely low that this theory led to any observers. A non-null observation would thus have such a low likelihood within this single-history theory that it would be strong evidence against this theory.
On the other hand, in the many-worlds version of this theory, both "worlds" would exist, with the measures indicating something like the "amount" by which they exist. But since the observations that occur in the first "world" definitely exist within this many-worlds theory as realities and not just as possibilities, the existence of an observation is not evidence against this many-worlds theory.
To put it another way, for considering observations within a many-worlds theory, one must multiply the measure for each world by a measure for the observations within that world. (Crudely, one may use the number of observations within the world, though in a final theory I would expect a refinement, so that, for example, a human's observation is weighted more heavily than an ant's). When one does this for the example quantum cosmology theory above, the first "world" makes up the entirety of the weighting in the many-worlds theory, even though in the singlehistory theory that "world" has an extremely low probability and would be quite unexpected.
Now consider a second toy quantum cosmology theory in which there are two "worlds" that both have observers, but their numbers and observations differ. For example, let World A last just barely long enough for it to have 10 10 observers, all during the recontracting stage fairly near a big crunch, and let World B last much longer than the age range at which observers occur and have 10 90 observers when the universe is expanding. Suppose World A has measure almost unity and World B has measure 10 −30 . In the single-history version of this theory, these (normalized) measures are probabilities, so with near certainty, we can deduce that we should be in World A and see a contracting universe in this theory. Our actual observation of an expanding universe would then be strong evidence against this single-history quantum cosmology theory.
On the other hand, in the many-worlds version of this theory, all of the obser-vations actually exist. To calculate which observations are typical, one needs the measures for the observations themselves. Presumably these are given by the expectation values of certain operators associated with the corresponding observations [9] . Crudely one might suppose the total for all the observations within one "world" is roughly proportional to the number of observers within that "world," multiplied by the measure for the "world." At this level of approximation, the total measure for the observations in the many-worlds version of this second toy model is thus 10 10 for World A and 10 60 for World B. Therefore, an observation chosen at random in this many-worlds theory is 10 50 more likely to be from World B, with the universe observed to be expanding, than from World A with the universe seen to be contracting. Our actual observation of an expanding universe would then be consistent with this theory.
Thus in this second toy cosmological model, we can reject its single-history version because of the low probability it gives, not for our existence this time, but for whether we see the universe expanding. In this way observations can in principle be used to distinguish between many-worlds and single-history quantum theories, even if those different theories give the same set of quantum measures for their various "worlds."
There is the challenge that at present we apparently do not know enough about the quantum state of the universe to say with certainty whether our observations favor a many-worlds theory or a single-history theory. Nevertheless, I can summarize some highly speculative evidence that gives a preliminary suggestion that a manyhistories theory might be observationally favored.
This evidence starts with the Hartle-Hawking 'no-boundary' proposal for the quantum state of the universe [10] , which of course is quite speculative but seems to me to be the most elegant sketch so far of a proposal (certainly not technically complete at present) for the quantum state of the universe. Under certain unproven assumptions and approximations, in a homogeneous, isotropic three-sphere minisuperspace toy model with a single massive inflaton scalar field, the no-boundary proposal leads in the semiclassical regime to a set of "worlds" or macroscopic classical spacetimes that are Friedmann-Robertson-Walker universes with various amounts of inflation and hence various total lifetimes and maximum sizes, and with measure approximately proportional to e πa 2 0 , where a 0 is the radius of the Euclidean four-dimensional hemisphere where the solution nucleates [10] .
This nucleating radius a 0 is inversely proportional to the initial value of the inflaton scalar field, multiplied by its mass m in Planck units, whereas the growth factor during inflation, and the lifetime of the resulting Friedmann-Robertson-Walker universe, go exponentially with the square of the initial value of the inflaton scalar field. Therefore, if one works out the quantum measure in terms of the volume of the universe at the end of inflation (say V in Planck units), one finds that at the tree level it is very roughly proportional to exp [(4.5π/m 2 )/(ln m 3 V + 1.5 ln ln m 3 V )] for large values of m 3 V (the universe lifetime in units of the Compton wavelength of the inflaton scalar field).
Since the mass m is very small in Planck units, say roughly 10 −6 [11] , the factor of 4.5π/m 2 is very large, say roughly 10 13 , and one gets an utterly enormous exponential peak in the measure at relatively small values of m 3 V . (There is a cutoff in m 3 V at a value of order unity, below which there is no inflationary solution [12] , so the measure distribution does not actually have a divergence, but the exponential of an argument of order 10
13 is a rather large number even if it is not infinite.) The expression above for the measure rapidly decreases with increasing lifetime and then flattens out to become asymptotically constant when m 3 V gets large in comparison with exp (4.5π/m 2 ). If one takes at face value the expression above for the measure for all values of m 3 V above its lower cutoff (at some number of order unity), then although the measure has an utterly enormous exponential peak at small values of m 3 V , this is in turn overwhelmed by the divergence one gets when one integrates the measure (actually a measure density) to infinite values of m 3 V . Then the total measure would be completely dominated by universes with arbitrarily large amounts of inflation. This means that with unit normalized probability, our universe would be arbitrarily large and arbitrarily flat when one ignores density fluctuations from corrections to the homogeneous isotropic minisuperspace model [13] .
However, the expression above for the measure is purely at the tree-level or zeroloop approximation, ignoring prefactors that are expected to distort the measure distribution significantly for m 3 V large in comparison with exp (4.5π/m 2 ), because these enormous universes are generated by inflation that starts with the inflaton potential exceeding the Planck density, where one cannot trust the tree-level approximation or any other approximation we have at present.
If the correct quantum measure distribution diverges when one integrates to infinity the spatial volume shortly after the end of inflation, then the universe is most probably arbitrarily large and very near the critical density (spatially very flat), whether a many-worlds or a single-history quantum theory is correct, and so our observation of a universe near the critical density would not distinguish between the two possibilities.
However, if the correct quantum measure density is cut off for large initial values of the inflaton energy density so that one does not get arbitrarily large universes with certainty, then the enormous exponential peak in the distribution at small universes is likely to dominate and (in a single-history version in which the quantum state collapses to a single macroscopic Friedmann-Robertson-Walker uni-verse) make the universe most probably have only a small amount of inflation and a very short lifetime, not sufficient to produce observers, like the first world in the first example above. If one said that somehow the quantum state collapsed to a Friedmann-Robertson-Walker universe that gets large enough for observers, then the most probable one under this requirement would be one that lasts just barely long enough for observers before the final big crunch. In this case the observers would most likely exist only near the end of the universe, when it is recollapsing, like World A in the second example above, which is contrary to our observations of an expanding universe. Thus a single-history version of this theory with the quantum measure cut off to produce a normalizable probability distribution would most likely be refuted by our observations of an expanding universe.
On the other hand, if one took a many-worlds version of this quantum cosmology theory, one would have to weight the "worlds" (classical universes) by something like the number of observers within them. One would expect this number to be proportional to the volume of space at the time and other conditions when observers can exist (other factors being equal) [14] . Therefore, in the many-worlds version one would multiply the quantum measure given above for the "worlds" (the "bare" probability distribution for universe configurations [15] ) by something like V to get the measure for observations (the "observational" probability distribution [15] ).
The result, V exp [(4.5π/m 2 )/(ln m 3 V + 1.5 ln ln m 3 V )], is then sufficiently rapidly rising with large m 3 V that the part with large m 3 V , even if cut off at m 3 V of order exp (4.5π/m 2 ), dominates over the exponentially large peak near the minimum value of m 3 V . As argued in [15] , there is thus enough space for the no-boundary proposal to be consistent with our observations of a large and expanding universe, but this argument implicitly assumed a many-worlds version of the no-boundary proposal. Similar arguments had been given earlier in the broader context of eternal stochastic inflation [14] , but these arguments also implicitly assumed a many-worlds version of quantum theory. In a single-history version, it seems plausible that the HartleHawking 'no-boundary' quantum state may collapse with nearly unit probability to a classical universe configuration that only lasts of the order of the Compton wavelength of the inflaton scalar field, presumably far too short to be consistent with our observations. This suggestive evidence against a single-history quantum cosmology theory is of course not yet conclusive, since we do not yet know what the quantum state of the universe is. Indeed, the 'tunneling' wavefunction proposal of Vilenkin, Linde, and others [16] predicts that the "bare" quantum measure for small universes is exponentially suppressed, rather than enhanced as discussed above for the HartleHawking 'no-boundary' proposal. This 'tunneling' proposal would thus apparently be consistent with our observations whether one used a many-worlds version or a single-history version. But the possibility is open that increased theoretical understanding of quantum cosmology may lead us to favor a quantum theory, such as the 'no-boundary' one may turn out to be when it is better understood, that is consistent with our observations only in its many-worlds version rather than in its single-history version.
Another tentative piece of observational evidence in favor of many-worlds quantum theory is a comparison with the calculation [17] of likely values of the cosmological constant. If the assumptions of that paper are correct, and if the "subuniverses" used there are the "worlds" used here ("terms in the state vector" [17] ) rather than different spacetime regions within one "world" ("local bangs" [17] ), then our observational evidence of the cosmological constant is consistent with many-worlds quantum theory but not with single-history quantum theory. However, we need a better understanding of physics to know whether the assumptions are correct (such as the assumption that "the cosmological constant takes a variety of values in different 'subuniverses' " [17] ).
Therefore, it may turn out, when we better understand fundamental physics and quantum cosmology, that the observational evidence of the expansion of the universe and of the cosmological constant may lead us to favor many-world quantum theories over single-history quantum theories, without having to wait a time long in comparison with our life expectancies for the evidence of our continued existence to favor many-world theories.
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